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Job creation schemes (JCS) have been one of the most important programmes of active
labour market policy in Germany throughout the 1990s and into the first decade of
the new century. A number of studies have analysed the effects of job creation schemes
in Germany, presenting an overall disappointing picture. JCS seem to perform poorly
in improving the employability or the chances of leaving unemployment for the partici-
pating individuals. The study extends the existing literature by an evaluation of JCS
with the timing-of-events methodology in the duration context using administrative
data for eastern Germany. The analysis is based on a multivariate mixed proportional
hazard rate model that accounts for observable and unobservable characteristics. The
results show that JCS increase the individual unemployment duration of the partici-
pants. The negative effect results from a locking-in effect and a strong negative effect
after the programme has finished. Therefore, the results suggest that JCS do not im-
prove the employment prospects for the participants.
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1 Introduction
Germany’s active labour market policy (ALMP)
programmes urgently require critical reassessment,
given the high and persistent unemployment rates
in eastern and western Germany (20.1 and 9.4 per-
cent in 2004), tight government budgets and massive
amounts spent on these programmes (19.5 bn Euros
in 2003). One of the most important programmes
during the 1990s and early 2000s were job creation
schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, JCS).
Designed as a kind of subsidised work for unem-
ployed persons facing barriers to employment, JCS
aim at stabilising the economic situation of unem-
ployed people and qualifying them for later re-inte-
gration into regular jobs. Although the efforts of the
Federal Employment Agency (FEA) have been im-
mense and these programmes were the second most
important in terms of fiscal spending and the num-
ber of individuals receiving support (about 1.7 mil-
lion between 1997 and 2004, with expenditures
amounting to over 24 billion Euros), doubt has been
raised about the effectiveness of the programme in
terms of improving people’s employment chances.
The main criticism concerns the lack of components
that improve human capital and the presence of
negative incentives to seek work actively, like exces-
sively high wages and long programme durations of
about 12 months. The effects of JCS in Germany
have been analysed in a number of studies, revealing
an overall disappointing picture: JCS seem to per-
form poorly in improving the employability or chan-
ces of leaving unemployment for those participating.
The purpose of this paper is to supplement the exist-
ing literature by an evaluation of JCS with the tim-
ing-of-events methodology, as suggested by Abbring
and van den Berg (2003). Recent programme evalu-
ation literature (see Abbring and van den Berg
(2003) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2004)) has
emphasised the importance of the information on
the timing of the treatment event. First Abbring and
van den Berg (2003) showed that the timing of the
treatment event conveys additional useful informa-
tion for the identification of the treatment effect.
Second, as emphasised by Fredriksson and Johans-
son (2004), the dynamic assignment of treatments
has serious implications for the validity of the condi-
tional independence assumptions usually invoked to
estimate treatment effects. Furthermore, the follow-
ing approach considers the individual unemploy-
ment duration as the outcome of interest. If the pur-
pose of JCS is achieved, i.e. a participation in a JCS
programme increases the probability of a re-integra-
tion into employment, we would observe a reduc-
tion of the individual unemployment duration. For
analysing the impact of JCS on the individual unem-
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ployment duration we use highly informative admin-
istrative data of the FEA for eastern Germany only.
In comparison, existing evaluations of JCS based on
administrative data typically consider the impact on
employment rates. A recent example is Hujer and
Thomsen (2006), who estimate the impact of JCS on
the employment rate with a propensity score match-
ing which, similar to the following analysis, takes
into account the timing of the treatment event.
The econometric model is based on a multivariate
mixed proportional hazard model that accounts for
observed and unobserved factors. The consideration
of the unobserved factors enables the identification
of the treatment effect in the presence of selectivity
conditional on unobservable factors. Most evalua-
tion studies solve the selectivity problem via condi-
tional independence assumptions, which require that
all selectivity is captured by observable characteris-
tics.Incontrast,theanalysisinthemixedproportional
hazard framework also allows us to accountfor possi-
ble unobserved determinants. The possibility to ac-
count for unobserved heterogeneity, however, comes
at the cost of several assumptions with respect to the
functionalformintheempiricalmodel.Recently,sim-
ilar approaches have been applied in studies on other
countries, like Bonnal, Fougere, and Serandon (1997)
for France, Richardson and van den Berg (2001) for
Sweden, Lalive, van Ours, and Zweimüller (2002)
for Switzerland and van Ours (2004) for Slovakia. A
comprehensive survey of the methodology can be
found in van den Berg (2001).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
the institutional set-up for JCS in Germany and a
brief overview of the existing studies in Germany.
Section 3 presents the empirical model utilised to
estimate the effect of JCS on the transition into reg-
ular employment. Section 4 presents a description
of the data used. The results of the empirical analy-
sis are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Job Creation Schemes in Germany
JCS were introduced in 1969. For many years they
were the second most important measure of Ger-
man ALMP after vocational training programmes.
The legal basis is defined in §§ 260 to 271 and 416
of the Social Code III (Sozialgesetzbuch III, SGB
III) enacted in 1998, replacing the Employment Pro-
motion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, AFG) from
1969. JCS provide jobs for unemployed persons fac-
ing barriers to employment and aim at stabilising
the economic situation of participants and qualify
them for later (re-)integration into regular (non-
subsidised) work. The jobs are in different economic
sectors, e.g., agriculture, construction and social ser-Reinhard Hujer and Christopher Zeiss The Effects of Job Creation Schemes on the Unemployment Duration
vices. Financial support takes the form of wage sub-
sidies (in general 30 to 75 percent of the worker’s
salary) or loans to the institutions carrying out the
programme, i.e. service providers or employers. The
ordinary duration of support for JCS is twelve
months, but exceptions can be made extending the
duration to 24 or even 36 months if participation
will be followed by a permanent job. To prevent
deadweight losses and substitution effects the pro-
gramme is intended to support only those activities
that are additional in nature, of value to society and
carried out by persons in need of assistance. Addi-
tional in nature means that the activities would not
be accomplished without the subsidies. They are of
value to society if their outcome is for the collective
good. Due to these requirements, the majority of
JCS are low-skill jobs.
Eligible individuals are assigned to these pro-
grammes by caseworkers. Eligibility is generally
granted to those who have been long-term unem-
ployed (more than one year) or unemployed for at
least six of the twelve months prior to programme
start. They also have to fulfil the eligibility criteria
for receipt of unemployment benefit or assistance,
for vocational training programmes, or for voca-
tional integration of the disabled. Independently of
these requirements, the local employment agencies
(LEAs) are allowed to place younger unemployed
people (aged 25 or younger) without completed vo-
cational training, severely disabled people, tutors
and up to five percent of the participants who do
not meet the general eligibility criteria. When the
unemployed person has registered at the LEA, the
case is assigned to a caseworker who meets the un-
employed person at regular intervals to evaluate the
individual’s efforts at finding a job and to develop a
plan together with the unemployed person for inte-
gration into employment. This procedure grants the
caseworker a large degree of discretion in allocating
these programmes to unemployed individuals. The
caseworker offers only the unemployed person a job
in a JCS when the individual is deemed needy of
assistance because he/she cannot be integrated into
regular employment and does not fulfil the condi-
tions for other ALMP programmes. The caseworker
chooses the job in consultation with the unemployed
person and according to the individual’s qualifica-
tions and interests. Priority is given to projects that
explicitly aim at improving the foundations for per-
manent employment, provide occupations for unem-
ployed people facing special barriers to employ-
ment, or improve the social and environmental in-
frastructure.1 Once assigned by a caseworker, the
1 Unemployed persons with special barriers to employment are
defined as long-term unemployed, severely disabled persons,
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programme is compulsory for the individual and re-
jection is sanctioned by stopping benefits for up to
twelve weeks. In repeated cases, the unemployed in-
dividual may lose his/her unemployment benefit en-
titlement permanently. Since placement depends on
the places available in programmes, it may some-
times it may be impossible to accommodate some
unemployed persons in these programmes.
JCS in Germany have been analysed in a number of
studies, see e.g. Huebler (1997), Kraus, Puhani, and
Steiner (2000), Eichler and Lechner (2002), Cali-
endo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2004, 2005, 2007) and
Hujer and Thomsen (2006). Whereas the earlier
studies were based on survey data, the more recent
studies (since 2003) are based on the administrative
data of the FEA like the data used in our analysis.
Most studies were not able to establish positive ef-
fects in terms of the different outcome variables ana-
lysed (e.g. employment, unemployment) with some
exceptions (see Eichler and Lechner (2002) and
some subgroups in Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen
(2004, 2005, 2006, 2007)). These disadvantageous re-
sults of JCS were also found in restricted estima-
tions for eastern Germany. For this reason the over-
all picture presented by the existing studies suggests
that JCS are not able to support the re-integration
into regular employment.
3 Econometric Model
We evaluate the impact of JCS on the transitions
from unemployment into regular employment using
a bivariate duration model as suggested by Abbring
and van den Berg (2003). Normalising the point in
time when an individual enters unemployment to
zero, we measure the duration until the individual
enters a regular job, Te, and the duration until the
individual enters a job creation scheme, Tp. Te and
Tp are assumed to be non-negative and continuous
random variables with realisations denoted as te and
tp. The durations Te and Tp are assumed to vary with
time-invariant observable characteristics x and un-
observable characteristics v. The observable charac-
teristics x are the same for both distributions, i.e.
no exclusion restrictions on x are imposed. For the
unobserved characteristics, we assume ve(vp) to cap-
ture the unobserved determinants of Te(Tp).
The empirical analysis is based on the assumption
that participation in a job creation scheme affects
the distribution of Te if the treatment occurs before
the individual leaves unemployment. Following Ab-
older unemployed persons with placement restrictions, as well as
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bring and van den Berg (2003), we assume that the
realisation tp affects the distribution of Te in a deter-
ministic way from tp onwards. For the specification
of the joint distributions Te,Tp|x,ve,vp, we focus on
the conditional hazard rates θe(t|tp, x, ve) and
θp(t|x,vp).
We use mixed proportional hazards (MPH) specifi-
cations, where duration dependence, observable and
unobservable covariates enter the hazard rate multi-
plicatively. The hazard rate for the transition into
employment at time t is given by
θe(t|tp,x, ve)=λe(t) exp[x e +
μ(t Ð tp, x)I(t > tp)+ve], (1)
where λe(t) is the baseline hazard that captures the
duration dependence. The individual level of the
hazard rate conditional on the observable character-
istics is determined by the systematic part exp(x )
and the term exp(ve), which represents the influence
on the individual level due to the unobserved char-
acteristics. The treatment effect exp[μ(t Ð tp, x)I
(t > tp)] is specified as the causal effect of tp on the
hazard rate θe(t|tp, x,ve), where I(t > tp) is an indica-
tor function taking the value 1 if t > tp. The treat-
ment effect can be interpreted as a shift of the haz-
ard rate by exp[μ(t Ð tp, x)], which is directly associ-
ated with the expected remaining unemployment
duration, i.e. a positive treatment effect will shorten
the expected remaining unemployment duration. In
this general specification, the treatment effect is al-
lowed to depend on the time since the treatment has
started t Ð tp and on the observable characteristics
x. In our empirical analysis, we utilise three specifi-
cations for the treatment effect. First, we estimate a
time-invariant treatment effect exp[μI(t > tp)] that
shifts the hazard rate permanently by exp(μ)i ft h e
individual starts a job creation scheme. Second, we
specify a piecewise constant treatment effect with
two intervals exp[μ1I(tp < t  tp+c)+μ2I(t > tp+c)],
where c is an exogenous given constant. With this
specification, the hazard rate shifts by exp(μ1) at the
moment the individual enters the programme and
after a duration c, the hazard is shifted by exp(μ2).
This model enables us to test whether the treatment
effect is constant over time. Finally, we estimate the
treatment effect as a time-invariant treatment effect
that is allowed to vary over individual characteristics
exp[μ(x)].
The transition rate from unemployment into JCS is
analogously specified as
θp(t|x,vp)=λp(t) exp[x p + vp], (2)
with the baseline hazard λp(t), the systematic part
exp(x p) and the unobserved heterogeneity term
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exp(vp). In the empirical model we not only con-
sider the binary information if the individual has re-
ceived a treatment, but also utilise the information
on the timing of the treatment within the unemploy-
ment spell for the identification of the treatment ef-
fect. Abbring and van den Berg (2003) have shown
that this conveys additional useful information for
the identification of the treatment effect in the pres-
ence of selectivity. Selectivity means that those indi-
viduals who are seen to receive a treatment at tp
are a non-random subset with respect to te.I nt h e
following, we assume that all selectivity is related to
observable and unobservable characteristics. There-
fore, conditional on the observable variables x se-
lectivity appears as a dependence between the unob-
served heterogeneity terms ve and vp. Conditional
on the set of observable variables x and the unob-
servable heterogeneity ve und vp the durations
Te and Tp are only dependent in exp[μ(t Ð tp, x)I
(t > tp)]. Thus, this factor can be given a causal
interpretation as the treatment effect (Abbring and
van den Berg, 2003). In comparison with the usual
matching estimation technique that solves the se-
lectivity problem by means of a conditional inde-
pendence assumption with respect to observable
characteristics, the model (1)Ð(2) imposes an ex-
tended conditional independence assumption that
accounts for observable and unobservable charac-
teristics. Therefore the model (1)Ð(2) can identify
the treatment effect even in the case where the
available observable characteristics are not suffi-
cient to describe the selection process. Note that
with regard to the observable characteristics the
model (1)Ð(2) imposes a proportionality assump-
tion that is not imposed by usual matching tech-
niques.
The timing of the treatment is a useful piece of in-
formation since it allows us to distinguish between
a time-invariant selection effect embodied by a de-
pendence between ve and vp and a causal treatment
effect that becomes effective at the moment the
treatment starts. If we consider the timing of a treat-
ment, a positive causal treatment effect leads to a
pattern where a transition into employment is typi-
cally realised very quickly after a transition into
treatment, no matter how long the elapsed duration
of unemployment is. In contrast, in the case of a
selection effect, we would observe a correlation be-
tween the points in time of the transitions into em-
ployment and programme (Abbring and van den
Berg 2003). In the case of a positive selection effect,
we would typically observe a pattern where a quick
transition into a programme is followed by a quick
transition into employment, i.e. both transitions oc-
cur very rapidly after the start of the unemployment
spell. Thus, the main difference between a treatmentReinhard Hujer and Christopher Zeiss The Effects of Job Creation Schemes on the Unemployment Duration
and a selectivity effect is that the former affects the
transition rate into employment only after a treat-
ment has been realised, whereas the latter affects
the transition rate everywhere. Including the timing
of events as identifying information has the further
advantage that no exclusion restrictions have to be
imposed on the observable variables, as is the case
in selection models. Such exclusion restrictions on x
are often hard to justify from a theoretical point of
view, since the information available to the re-
searcher is usually also available to the individual
under consideration.
Identification of the treatment effect requires that
individuals do not anticipate future treatments. An-
ticipatory effects are present if, for example, individ-
uals who are informed about their future participa-
tion in a job creation scheme reduce their search
activity in order to wait for the programme. In this
case, the hazard rate at t of an individual who antici-
pates a future treatment at time tp, will be different
from the hazard rate of an individual who obtains
an alternative treatment at time t* p for t  min{tp,t* p}.
Due to the anticipatory effect, the information on
the timing of the event would not be sufficient for
identification since a causal change in the hazard oc-
curs at the moment the information shock of the
treatment arrives. Information on the moment when
individuals are informed about a future treatment is
not available for the empirical analysis and we rule
out anticipatory effects of JCS. In this context, it has
to be noted that the assumption of no anticipatory
effects does not rule out that the individuals act on
the determinants of Tp. That is, individuals are al-
lowed to adjust their optimal behavior to the deter-
minants of the treatment process, but not to the real-
isations of tp.
To account for the possible dependence in the unob-
served heterogeneity terms, we allow ve and vp to
follow an arbitrary joint distribution function
G(ve,vp). Abbring and van den Berg (2003) show
that, with assumptions similar to those made in
standard univariate MPH models, the bivariate
model (1)Ð(2) and the treatment effect in particular
are identified. Furthermore, since no parametric as-
sumptions with respect to the baseline hazard and
the unobserved heterogeneity distribution are re-
quired, identification of the treatment effect is non-
parametric. In order to estimate the model by maxi-
mum likelihood2, we specify a flexible duration de-
2 We repeated all estimations from different starting values in
order to find the global maximum. Alternatively, the model could
be estimated by an EM algorithm as suggested by Heckman and
Singer (1984). However, the convergence speed is extremely slow.
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pendence as a piecewise constant baseline hazard
rate.
In order to build the likelihood function for the esti-
mation of the model, we have to account for cen-
sored observations. If we define the censoring indi-
cators δe and δp, with δe =1( δp =1 )i fTe(Tp)i s
right-censored, the individual likelihood contribu-
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Following Heckman and Singer (1984), the arbitrary
distribution function G(ve,vp) can be approximated
by a discrete distribution with a finite number of
support points. For the unobserved heterogeneity
distribution, we assume that ve and vp can take on
two possible values, such that four combinations
with an associated probability are possible. This
specification is rather flexible and computationally
feasible (Richardson and van den Berg 2001). The
estimates were done by maximum likelihood, where
the joint unobserved heterogeneity distribution adds
seven unknown parameters to the model. For the
estimation by maximum likelihood, it is helpful to
utilise a logistic specification for the probability,










and qj,k are parameters to be estimated.
4 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on an inflow-sample
of individuals who entered unemployment in the
months June, August and October 2000. The infor-The Effects of Job Creation Schemes on the Unemployment Duration Reinhard Hujer and Christopher Zeiss
mation is merged from several administrative sour-
ces of the FEA. These sources are the job-seeker
database (Bewerberangebotsdatei), the employment
statistics register (Beschäftigtenstatistik) and the pro-
gramme participants master data set (Maßnahme-
Teilnehmer-Grunddatei). The job-seeker database
contains information on socio-demographic charac-
teristics, qualification and placement restraints, a
short labour market history and the date of entry
into unemployment. From these data, we obtain the
observable covariates and the entry date into unem-
ployment.
Our outcome of interest, the transition into employ-
ment, is derived from the employment statistics reg-
ister, which includes information on all persons reg-
istered in the social security system. These are all
individuals in regular employment and participants
in several ALMP programmes, but no self-employed
persons or pensioners. It is the basis for individual
pension claims, and contains information on all epi-
sodes of dependent employment. In addition, we
use data from the programme participants master
data set to identify episodes of participation in
ALMP programmes and especially JCS. For the ob-
servation period from June 2000 to December 2003
the merged data allows us to identify whether the
individuals were registered as employed or as partic-
ipants in an ALMP programme. For the registered
employment periods, we observe the associated
record dates (usually at the end of the month) and
for the programme participation periods, the exact
entry and exit dates. From this information and the
entry date into unemployment, we are able to calcu-
late the duration of unemployment until the first
transition into registered employment Te and the du-
ration of unemployment until the first transition into
a JCS Tp with the day as the time unit. It should be
noted that with the exception of the entry date into
unemployment, we are not able to observe whether
the individuals are registered as unemployed. There-
fore, the time from the entry into unemployment
until the first record of registered employment
serves as an approximation of the unemployment
duration. In particular, labour force movements and
unregistered employment cannot be considered with
this data. This might be especially of importance for
women, who leave the labour force more often com-
pared to men.
From the programme participants master data set
we also observe whether individuals enter alterna-
tive ALMP programmes such as vocational training
measures. If an individual enters an alternative
ALMP programme before he/she enters a registered
job we consider the unemployment spell as censored
at the point in time when the transition into the al-
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ternative programme occurs. Hence, a participation
in a JCS after a participation in an alternative pro-
gramme is not considered, nor are any transitions
into employment after a participation in an alterna-
tive programme. As a consequence the estimated
treatment effect refers only to the impact of a single
JCS participation within the unemployment spell
that is not accompanied by an alternative treatment.
Furthermore, we observe censored spells in cases
where no transition within the observation window
can be found.
The initial sample consists of 42,969 individuals in
eastern Germany, with 13,295 individuals who en-
tered unemployment in June 2000, 17,081 individu-
als who entered unemployment in August 2000 and
12,593 individuals who entered unemployment in
October 2000. The differences in the size of the sam-
ples is mainly due to seasonal fluctuations. From this
sample, we excluded 4,381 individuals who either
participated in ALMP programmes in the period
from January 2000 up to their unemployment entry
or exhibited errors in the data. Furthermore, we re-
stricted the sample for homogeneity reasons to
17,475 individuals who are domestic, not affected by
health restrains, not disabled and between 25 and 55
years of age. Regarding the number of participants,
i.e. those individuals who entered a job creation
scheme within their unemployment spell, we ob-
serve 628 (3.6%) participants in the sample.
JCS have an ordinary programme duration of 12
months. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
within this period participants withdraw at least
partly from active job-search, especially if participa-
tion entails a full-time job. In the presence of this
locking-in effect, our model ignores the fact that the
transition rate into employment would be extremely
low during the participation period. In order to
avoid a misspecification of the model Richardson
and van den Berg (2001) suggested that the period
when individuals are placed in the programme
should not be included. So, as our baseline assump-
tion, the time spent in a JCS does not contribute to
the unemployment duration. In this case, the treat-
ment effect corresponds only to the after-pro-
gramme period, and the variable of interest is the
duration of regular unemployment. Note that if we
include the length of the participation period, the
treatment effect would correspond to the in- and
after-programme period and the variable of interest
would be the duration without a regular job. We ad-
dress this issue explicitly in a sensitivity analysis in
the following section.
Figure 1 presents non-parametric Kaplan-Meier es-
timates of the hazard rate and the survivor functionReinhard Hujer and Christopher Zeiss The Effects of Job Creation Schemes on the Unemployment Duration
for our sample (see Kalbfleisch and Prentice
(2002)). For the hazard rate into employment, the
figure shows a sharp increase immediately after the
unemployment spell has started. After an unem-
ployment duration of approximately three months
the hazard rate starts to decline. The associated esti-
mated survivor function shows that the probability
to still being unemployed after one year is around
40% and around 30% after two years. Apparently
discouraged worker and stigmatisation effects play
a significant role here.
Considering the hazard rate into JCS, we find that
the probability of being assigned to a programme
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increases within the first year of unemployment. The
maximum hazard is achieved shortly after one year
of unemployment. In the subsequent period up to
one and a half years, the hazard decreases to a lower
level, which remains throughout the second year of
unemployment. After the second year, the hazard
rate decreases further, and finally increases again
shortly before the third year of unemployment is
completed. In line with the hazard rate, the esti-
mated survivor function barely shows a decrease es-
pecially for the first six months. A 10% probability
to enter a JCS is achieved after two years of unem-
ployment. Generally, the figures show that the prob-
ability to be placed in a JCS increases as the prob-The Effects of Job Creation Schemes on the Unemployment Duration Reinhard Hujer and Christopher Zeiss
ability to enter employment decreases. This shows
that JCS are mainly aimed at the long term unem-
ployed.
Table 1 presents descriptive results for the observa-
ble covariates separated for the total sample, the
treatment group and the non-treatment group re-
spectively. The covariates cover several variables to
characterise the individual heterogeneity. All of the
variables are measured at the point in time when
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the individuals enter the unemployment spell and
are therefore constant over the observed time pe-
riod. They include sociodemographic variables like
age, sex (women), family status and number of chil-
dren. Individual qualifications are represented by
the type of vocational education, schooling and the
caseworker’s assessment of occupational qualifica-
tions (Level of Qualification). Further information
includes vocational experience and the type of work
the individuals are looking for (Applicant for Full-Reinhard Hujer and Christopher Zeiss The Effects of Job Creation Schemes on the Unemployment Duration
time Job, Desired Occupational Group). The sets of
dummy variables refer to the following reference
categories: those for vocational education to individ-
uals with no vocational education, those for the level
of qualifications to individuals with or without tech-
nical knowledge, those for schooling to individuals
with no secondary school qualifications, those for
family status to single and unmarried individuals,
and the dummy variables for the desired occupa-
tional group refer to individuals who want to work
in the agriculture and fishery industry, the mining
industry and miscellaneous occupations.
For our sample we find that the majority of individu-
als are applicants for full-time jobs and have occupa-
tional experience. Furthermore, we find that most
individuals obtained their vocational education by
means of in-firm training and have a low level of
qualifications and schooling. Regarding the desired
occupational group, we find that most individuals
want to work in service occupations and in the
manufacturing industry.
Considering the descriptives for the participant and
non-participant groups separately, we find several
differences. The participant group consists of older
individuals and features a larger share of women
and married individuals. With respect to education
the descriptive results show that participants gener-
ally have a lower level of vocational and school
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eduction. This shows that JCS are targeted towards
disadvantaged persons in the labour market. This
also confirms the results the qualification level,
where a larger share of participants with the lowest
level of qualifications can be found. Regarding the
desired occupational group, we find for the partici-
pant group a larger share of individuals who want
to work in the manufacturing industry, whereas in
the non-treatment group, jobs in service occupations
are preferred.
Although the available data provides a relatively ex-
tensive set of observable characteristics some possi-
ble important determinants for both transition rates
are not available. For example, information on
former unemployment or employment periods as
well as information on the motivation of the individ-
uals is not considered. However, in the empirical
analysis these unconsidered determinants are cap-
tured by the unobserved heterogeneity term.
Finally, Figure 2 presents the distribution of the pro-
gramme durations in our sample, measured in
months. The figure shows that participation in a JCS
usually last for a period of one year. Further peaks
can be found for programme durations of six
months and two years. The relatively high share of
programmes with a duration of 12 months shows
that locking-in effects are an important issue when
evaluating JCS.The Effects of Job Creation Schemes on the Unemployment Duration Reinhard Hujer and Christopher Zeiss
5 Estimation Results
Table 2 shows the estimation results for the basic
model where the treatment effect is specified as a
constant and permanent shift of the hazard rate. The
main parameter of interest is the treatment effect μ
which represents the causal impact of participation
in a job creation scheme on the hazard rate into em-
ployment. This effect is, with exp(Ð0.22) = 0.8, neg-
ative and significantly different from zero. Since in
this specification, the length of the participation pe-
riod is excluded from Te, the treatment effect corre-
sponds to the after-programme period, i.e. there is
no locking-in effect at work here. Implicitly, this ef-
fect compares a participant in the period after hav-
ing completed the programme with a non-partici-
pant in the period after the programme has started.
The effect states that at the point in time when an
individual has finished a job creation scheme, the
hazard rate is reduced by 20%.
From the estimated effect on the hazard rate, we are
able to derive the effect on the expected unemploy-
ment duration conditional on the programme entry.
For a programme entry after six months of unem-
ployment, we find that a participant has a 27%
higher expected unemployment duration than an in-
dividual who is not treated at all. If the programme
entry occurs after a year, the treatment effect im-
plies an extension of the expected unemployment
duration of only 21% and if programme entry is
after one and a half years, the expected unemploy-
ment duration is reduced by 17%. Thus, the model
implies that treatment at an earlier stage of unem-
ployment has a stronger effect on the expected un-
employment duration.
Turning to the covariate effects, we find that the
transition rate into employment is higher for
women, married people and individuals who are
seeking a job in the manufacturing industry or in
service occupations. Furthermore, we detect a posi-
tive impact of in-firm training and a negative impact
of age. Regarding the transition rate into JCS, we
find that the hazard increases with age and the num-
ber of children, and we find a higher hazard for
women. With respect to education, we observe a
positive impact of education at technical schools and
of qualifications at the advanced technical college
level.
Considering the unobserved heterogeneity distribu-
tion, the estimates in Table 2 imply a constant term
of ve1 = Ð9.64 and ve2 = Ð4.36 for the transition rate
into employment and a constant term of vp1 =
Ð11.38 and vp2 = Ð11.21 for the transition rate into
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JCS. The associated probabilities are P(ve1,vp1)=
0%, P(ve1,vp2) = 56%, P(ve2,vp1) = 44% and
P(ve2,vp2) = 0%. With two points of support for
each unobserved heterogeneity term, ve1 and vp1
represent a relatively low propensity, and ve2 and vp2
a relatively high propensity to leave unemployment
and enter employment or programme participation.
The estimated distribution of the unobserved het-
erogeneity terms only supports the mass points
(ve,1,vp,2) and (ve,2,vp,1). Thus, only individuals with
a high propensity to enter employment and a low
propensity to enter a programme and individuals
with a low propensity to enter employment and a
high propensity to enter a programme are sup-
ported. However, for the transition rate into a pro-
gramme, the unobserved heterogeneity term is rela-
tively small and not significantly different from zero.
Furthermore, the standard errors for the estimated
probability of the unobserved heterogeneity distri-
bution are very large. Thus, we cannot find an im-
pact of unobserved determinants on the hazard into
programme participation and the results with re-
spect to the unobserved heterogeneity distribution
are not very robust. This suggest that the set of ob-
servable variables available in the administrative
data are sufficient to describe the selection process
into JCS.
To test the robustness of the estimates with respect
to the unobserved heterogeneity, Table 3 presents
the estimation results for the basic model where un-
observed heterogeneity is ignored. For this model,
only one point of support for the constant term
is imposed. Considering the treatment effect we
also find a negative significant treatment effect of
exp(Ð0.30) = 0.73. Thus, if we ignore the unob-
served heterogeneity, we obtain a stronger treat-
ment effect. With respect to the covariates we ob-
serve that the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity
reduces the significance of most of the estimated pa-
rameters.
A big difference between the models with and with-
out unobserved heterogeneity can be found for the
estimated piecewise constant duration dependence.
For the model without unobserved heterogeneity,
we observe Ð with the exception of the last inter-
val Ð a negative duration dependence. In contrast,
the model that accounts for unobserved heterogene-
ity shows a positive duration dependence up to the
third interval, and for the remaining periods a nega-
tive duration dependence which is similar to the
model without unobserved heterogeneity. This
points to a dynamic sorting process which is cap-
tured by the unobserved heterogeneity. Note that a
stronger negative duration dependence is typical if
unobserved heterogeneity is ignored (see e.g., Lan-Reinhard Hujer and Christopher Zeiss The Effects of Job Creation Schemes on the Unemployment Duration
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caster (1990)). For the transition rate into a pro-
gramme, we do not observe a substantial difference
between the models with and without unobserved
heterogeneity. This is in line with the insignificant
unobserved heterogeneity parameter vp.
A further sensitivity analysis deals with the assump-
tion that the time spent in JCS does not contribute
to the unemployment duration. Therefore, we esti-
mated the basic model where the length of the par-
ticipation period in JCS is included in Te. With this
specification, the estimated treatment effect can be
interpreted as an average effect that consists of an
in-programme effect and an after-programme effect
(Richardson and van den Berg 2001). Table 4 con-
tains the estimation results for the basic model
where the time spent in programmes is excluded
from Te. For the estimation we use the specification
of the basic model with respect to the baseline haz-
ard, the covariates and the unobserved heterogene-
ity. The results for the baseline hazard and the cova-
riates are similar to the results from Table 2. For the
treatment effect we obtain a more negative effect of
exp(Ð0.28) = 0.75 compared to the effect in Table
2. The stronger effect when the participation period
is included suggests that the in-programme effect is
negative, i.e. JCS are associated with a locking-in
effect. However, the difference is not extremely
large. One explanation might be that JCS are tar-
geted at long-term unemployed people and that
locking-in effects are of minor importance for these
individuals.
The treatment effect estimated so far is specified as
a permanent and constant shift of the hazard rate
that occurs at the moment when the individual en-
ters a JCS programme. However, it is reasonable to
expect that a treatment effect is not constant over
time. For example, the effect of a participation in a
job creation scheme may take some time to develop
or the effect may diminish after a certain amount of
time. In order to analyse the dynamic development
of the treatment effect, we estimate an extended
model where the treatment effect is allowed to vary
over time. As presented in Section 3, the treatment
effect is specified as a piecewise constant function
of t Ð s, with μ1 as the treatment effect for the period
[s,s + c) and μ2 as the treatment effect for the period
[s + c, ). The extended model is estimated with the
same specification for the baseline hazard, the sys-
tematic part and the unobserved heterogeneity. Fur-
thermore, to compare the results with the basic
model in Table 2, the length of the participation pe-
riod is excluded from Te. Therefore, the point in
time tp corresponds to both the start and the end of
participation in the JCS. We estimated three models
where the exogenous given threshold c was set to
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90, 180 and 360 days respectively. The estimated pa-
rameters are given in Table 5. The estimates for the
baseline hazard, the covariates and the unobserved
heterogeneity are basically the same compared to
the basic model. For reasons of brevity these coeffi-
cients are not reported.
The model with c = 90 shows a strong and significant
negative effect of exp(Ð1.36) = 0.25 for the first
three months after the programme has finished and
an insignificant effect for the remaining period.
Thus, in the period up to three months after comple-
tion of the programme, we find a hazard rate that is
reduced by 75%. For the model where the treat-
ment effect is allowed to shift after 180 days,
we again find a negative significant effect of
exp(Ð1.09) = 0.33 for the period up to six months,
but a positive significant effect of exp(0.22) = 1.25
for the remaining periods. The model implies that in
the period up to six months after programme com-
pletion the hazard rate is reduced to 33%, and after
six months it increases to 125% of the baseline haz-
ard. Finally, the model with c = 360 again shows a
negative significant effect for the period up to one
year, which is smaller than the effect for the model
with c = 180, and a positive but insignificant effect
for the remaining period. Calculating the associated
impact on the expected unemployment duration un-
der the assumption that the participant enters a JCS
after one year, we find an increase by 14% for the
model with c = 90, an increase by 12.6% for the
model with c = 180 and for the model with c = 360
an increase by 9.8%.
The results suggest that the negative effect of JCS
on the hazard rate is especially strong in the period
immediately after the programme ends. Obviously,
if participants leave the programme they need some
time to recommence active job search. Interestingly,
we find a slightly positive effect, which is located
approximately in the period between six months and
twelve months after the programme. However, as
the basic model in Table 2 shows, this positive effect
is not strong enough to induce a positive total effect.
Furthermore, note that these results do not include
the locking-in effect which generally leads to a more
negative picture of JCS.
A final question we want to answer is whether the
treatment effect is heterogenous with respect to the
observable characteristics. Therefore, we estimated
a second extended model where the treatment effect
is specified as a permanent and constant shift of the
hazard rate, but where it is allowed to vary with the
observable characteristics. In addition to a main
treatment effect, we estimate a difference parameter
for females, for individuals without occupational ex-The Effects of Job Creation Schemes on the Unemployment Duration Reinhard Hujer and Christopher Zeiss
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perience and for individuals with a high qualifica-
tion level. This latter group comprises individuals
with a university or advanced technical college de-
gree. The model extended with respect to the effect
heterogeneity is estimated with the same specifica-
tion for the baseline hazard, the systematic part and
the unobserved heterogeneity, and the length of the
participation period is excluded from Te. The results
for the treatment effect are presented in Table 6,
where again the estimates for the baseline hazard,
the covariates and the unobserved heterogeneity are
not reported for the sake of brevity.
The main effect, which corresponds to the group of
men with low qualifications and with occupational
experience, is with exp(Ð0.21) = 0.81, nearly identi-
cal to the effect estimated by the basic model. For
none of the groups, we do find any significant differ-
ence for the treatment effect. Thus the estimated ef-
fect is relatively constant with respect to the consid-
ered observable characteristics.
6 Conclusion
JCS have been an important ALMP programme in
Germany in terms of the number of individuals re-
ceiving support and the amount spent. Although
their importance has decreased in recent years, they
are still used in particular on a large scale in eastern
Germany. Our empirical analysis aims to extend the
existing literature on the effects of JCS to incorpo-
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rate the timing-of-events approach of Abbring and
van den Berg (2003). Our analysis investigates
whether JCS are able to reduce the unemployment
duration of participants. In the empirical model the
timing of treatment within the unemployment spell
affects the distribution of the unemployment dura-
tion. The econometric analysis is based on a bivari-
ate mixed proportional hazard model, where the
transition rates into employment and into pro-
grammes are specified simultaneously. Selectivity
problems with respect to programme participation
are solved by allowing the transition rates to depend
on observable and unobservable characteristics.
The empirical analysis is based on an inflow-sample
of individuals who entered unemployment in the
months June, August and October 2000. The infor-
mation is merged from several administrative sour-
ces of the FEA. The estimates for a basic model
where the treatment effect is specified as a time-
invariant shift of the hazard rate shows a significant
negative effect of JCS on the transition rate into em-
ployment. However, if we take the time spent within
JCS into account as well, the effect becomes more
negative, i.e. JCS are apparently associated with a
locking-in effect. The analysis of an extended model
that allows for a time-varying treatment effect shows
that participation in a JCS is associated with a strong
negative effect, which appears immediately after the
programme has finished. Subsequent to this period,
we find a slight positive effect, which is located ap-
proximately in the period from six up to twelve
months after the programme has finished. However,
this effect is not strong enough to result in a positive
total effect. A further extended model allows the
treatment effect to vary over several observable
characteristics. However, the estimates do not sug-
gest a heterogenous treatment effect with respect to
the selected observable characteristics.
Summarising the results, we find that JCS in eastern
Germany increase the individual unemployment du-
ration of the participants. This results from a lock-
ing-in effect and a strong negative effect on the tran-
sition rate into employment which is especially ob-
servable for the period directly after the programmeThe Effects of Job Creation Schemes on the Unemployment Duration Reinhard Hujer and Christopher Zeiss
is completed, and when the participants re-enter un-
employment. Despite this clear negative finding, we
cannot make any statements about the impact of
JCS on subsequent unemployment spells or on the
stability of employment periods.
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